Last week I mentioned a revenue-sharing case that could have far-reaching implications.

That case, Tibble v. Edison International, was decided earlier this month (see “Court Buys Retail vs. Institutional Share Fee Claims”) and, IMHO, is a very interesting case for several reasons: First, most of these cases have been tossed before they actually got to trial; second, this one was decided in the plaintiff/participant’s favor (and that’s a rarer occurrence than much of the coverage and “chatter” would indicate). Moreover, here the court was far less deferential to the plan fiduciary decisions than other districts have been1.

But what I found most interesting about this case wasn’t the decision or the court’s rationale, though both will certainly have ramifications beyond this case. Nor, in large part, were the plaintiffs’ arguments any more compelling than in previous actions. In fact, like many of the revenue-sharing/excessive-fee cases filed since 2006, the plaintiffs here made a LOT of accusations—most of which were, as they have been in other cases (and rightfully, IMHO), summarily dismissed2. In this case, that included the selection of sector funds for the plan, having a money market fund on the menu rather than a stable value offering, and structuring the company stock fund as a unitized fund, rather than using share accounting.

Short Falls

Where this court did hold the plan fiduciaries3 liable was their decision to invest in retail shares rather than institutional shares of the same funds. But what I found most striking about the case wasn’t the allegations or the adjudication, but rather that what was, by outward appearances anyway, a thoughtful and sophisticated plan review structure would manage to overlook such a basic opportunity.

Here you have a large ($2-plus billion) plan that not only has an investment committee, but one separate from the benefits administration function. Moreover, that investment committee has access to, and uses the services of, an investment adviser (Hewitt’s investment consulting arm) to review/select/monitor funds. That’s a reasonably sophisticated set-up, and certainly what one might expect for a plan of this size.

Now, the plan decision-makers are aware of revenue-sharing but consistently make decisions that support the notion that they do not take that into account. In fact, the court noted that in 33 of 39 instances during the period in question, the employer made mutual fund replacements that actually decreased the revenue-sharing received by the plan, leaving the court to note, “This overall pattern is not consistent with a motive to increase revenue sharing.” In fact, the court noted that “[t]he Plan fiduciaries did not make fund selections with an eye toward increasing revenue sharing and did not put the interests of SCE above those of the Plan participants.”4

So, what do they fail to do?

Well, apparently they did not even ASK the investment fund providers to waive the minimums for investment in institutional class shares. That’s right, they never asked if those minimums could be waived—so, of course, they weren’t (particularly damning was the testimony of the employer’s expert that such waivers were routinely granted, and for plans of much smaller size). Think of it as “the duty to ask.”

As you read the court’s description of the process, you get a sense that the investment committee was attentive to an investment policy statement (IPS) that was carefully prepared and to which the committee adhered; that they met regularly, and thoughtfully conducted their review with the assistance of a professional investment consultant. The court even described a situation5 where the investment committee considered—and specifically chose—an institutional share class for a fund over a retail offering, because the institutional class met the criteria established by the IPS, whereas the retail class did not.

Yet, for all of this good structure and process, there was one thing that this particular plan sponsor failed to do: They apparently failed to ask if a “better” share class was available.

In the words of the court, “The only way a fiduciary can obtain a waiver of the investment minimum is to call and ask for one. Yet none of the Edison fiduciaries nor anyone acting on their behalf (including HFS) ever requested that the William Blair Fund waive the minimum investment so that the Plan could invest in the institutional share class. Had someone called on behalf of the Plan and requested a waiver of the investment minimum, the William Blair Fund almost certainly would have granted the waiver.”6

Retail “Sale?”

Not that using retail, rather than institutional shares was inherently wrong, even in this situation7. The court acknowledged that in defending the retail-share decision, witnesses for the defendant/employers offered three possible rationales: If the retail share class of a certain mutual fund had significant performance history and a Morningstar rating, but the institutional share class did not; to avoid confusion among participants resulting from frequent changes in the fund; or if there were certain minimum investment requirements, it might preclude the plan from investing in the institutional share classes. Judge Stephen V. Wilson didn’t say whether he would have found those arguments compelling—but then, he didn’t need to bother because, as he noted in the ruling, “None of these explanations is supported by the facts in this case.”

Rather, he noted that “[t]he Investments Staff simply recommended adding the retail share classes of these three funds without any consideration of whether the institutional share classes offered greater benefits to the Plan participants. Thus, the Plan fiduciaries responsible for selecting the mutual funds (the Investment Committees) were not informed about the institutional share classes and did not conduct a thorough investigation.”

Nor was it sufficient that the plan fiduciaries employed the services of an investment adviser. As the court noted: “While securing independent advice from HFS is some evidence of a thorough investigation, it is not a complete defense to a charge of imprudence. At the very least, the Plan fiduciaries must make certain that reliance on the expert’s advice is reasonably justified.”

It is nearly incomprehensible to me—and I would guess to most of you—that in this day and age, a plan fiduciary could be aware of the distinctions of an institutional share class7, and not take advantage of them.

Perhaps, since participants were paying the freight, the fee differential was simply out of sight and thus out of mind. But I’m guessing that the investment committee saw its duty as restricted to the selection and review of the most appropriate investment options under the terms of the IPS, regardless of cost. I wouldn’t be surprised if they saw expense management as the responsibility of the administrative committee—which, doubtless, either assumed that the investment committee’s deliberation included a consideration of fees, or didn’t feel equipped and/or empowered to inquire as to the availability of a less expensive class of shares. Perhaps both felt that their investment adviser was taking those factors into consideration. Ironically, it may well be that this program had so much structure and process that everybody thought somebody else was dealing with the one thing that now seems so obvious, it’s hard to imagine it was overlooked for so long.

Whatever the explanation, it’s clear that nobody was asking the right questions8, and thus, nobody—including the plan participants—was getting the right answer.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

1 This writer—and the Department of Labor—have had issues with the approach embraced by the courts in more than one of these revenue-sharing suits (see “IMHO: Court “Case”, “IMHO: The ‘Burden’ of Proof”, “IMHO: Second Opinions”, “IMHO: Winning Ways”, “IMHO: The Letter of the Law”).

2 see “IMHO: Fighting Words” at

3 Plaintiffs filed the suit as a class action on August 16, 2007, against Defendants Edison International, Southern California Edison Company, the Southern California Edison Company Benefits Committee, the Edison International Trust Investment Committee, the Secretary of the SCE Benefits Committee, SCE’s Vice President of Human Resources, and the Manager of SCE’s Human Resources Service Center.

4 Nor was the revenue-sharing arrangement hidden. The use of revenue-sharing to offset recordkeeping fees was not only discussed with employee unions, the court noted that the arrangement was disclosed to participants on approximately 17 occasions after the practice began in 1999.

5 In the course of that review, Ertel realized that the institutional share class of the PIMCO Fund had a significant performance history and a Morningstar rating, whereas the retail share class did not. Ertel also realized that the institutional share class charged less 12b-1 fees to the Plan participants. Thus, the Investments Staff recommended, and the Investment Committees adopted the recommendation, that the retail shares of the PIMCO Fund should be transferred into the institutional share class. These facts are very telling: In the one instance in which the Plan fiduciaries actually reviewed the different share classes of one of these three funds, the fiduciaries realized that it would be prudent to invest in the institutional share class rather than the retail share class. Had they done this diligence earlier, the same conclusion would have been apparent with regard to all three funds, and the Plan participants would have saved thousands of dollars in fees.

6 It surely didn’t help matters any that the expert witness hired by the employer-defendants testified that he had obtained waivers for plans as small as $50 million in total assets, and from the same funds as those in question here.

7 Lest some try to rely on this decision as absolute proof that the use of retail class funds is inherently imprudent in 401(k) plans, the court acknowledged in a footnote that “[p]laintiffs are not contending, and the Court has not found, that the mere inclusion of some retail share classes in the Plan constituted a violation of the duty of prudence. The only issue here is whether it was a breach of the duty of prudence to select retail shares rather than institutional shares of the same mutual fund where the only difference between the two share classes was that the retail share class charged a higher fee.”

8 Perhaps including this court. Though there were six funds in question, only three were the focus of the ruling, and for which the plan fiduciaries were held to account for the difference in costs between the retail and institutional shares. The other three were added to the fund menu earlier, apparently outside the applicable statute of limitations, but otherwise seemed to have the same institutional/retail class issues—yet the court rebuffed those claims.

What was the difference? Well, it seems that the plaintiffs didn’t challenge the initial decision to invest (my guess would be because they knew it was outside the statute of limitations), but they did argue that there were subsequent events (change in fund name, manager, etc.) that should have triggered a fresh review, a review in which they argued the whole institutional/retail issue should have arisen, and thus they should be liable as they were in the case of the funds added later. However, this judge was apparently only focusing on the initial decision, and found no reason that the subsequent fund changes should have triggered a full review, and thus—no violation of fiduciary duty. So much for the duty to monitor.

Remember when it used to be quiet in July?

Not so this past week, with the announcement of two major retirement industry acquisitions, a significant update on fee disclosure regulations, and a ruling in a revenue-sharing case that could have far-reaching implications.

On the two industry acquisitions, LPL’s absorption of National Retirement Partners (NRP) will surely be of most interest to the adviser community (see LPL Acquiring National Retirement Partners). LPL, which had only recently launched an IPO (and is thus literally in a “quiet period”), has struggled for some time with its retirement plan focus, while NRP has had its own share of issues in the wake of the recent financial crisis. LPL’s backing should certainly prove to be restorative for NRP’s positioning, and it’s hard to imagine that a newly constituted retirement-focused unit at LPL under Bill Chetney’s leadership won’t provide a clarity of focus for LPL’s efforts in this space.

Plan sponsors may feel a greater immediate impact from Aon’s acquisition of Hewitt (see Hewitt to Merge with Aon), the rationale is that the former’s middle-market product set (especially its insurance lines) will find room to grow in Hewitt’s predominantly large-client base, while Hewitt’s large-plan expertise will be able to find new applications in Aon’s target markets. Those notions inevitably look logical on paper; time will tell if the firms’ cultures and client approaches will assimilate. That said, the new partners are projecting a LOT of cost savings alongside a $5 billion merger—and in a people-intensive business.

As for the final release of the 408(b)(2) fee disclosure regulations, the wait appears to have been worth it (see DoL Issues New Fee Disclosure Rules). I am admittedly not yet all the way through a careful reading of the interim final package, but the removal of a written-contract requirement surely meets the common sense test, while retaining the impact of written disclosures. Similarly, the approach on disclosure—a reliance on full disclosure rather than the, to my eye, more limited conflict-of-interest focus of the prior regulations, should provide plan fiduciaries with more information, even if it does bring with it a potentially greater effort in sifting for those conflicts. Finally—and this is the provision almost certainly likely to draw the most industry focus—the DoL has opted to require that “certain providers of multiple services” disclose separately recordkeeping costs.

This was one of the more controversial provisions in the earlier proposals, and the Labor Department at that time tried to craft a “Solomonic” yet practical solution for those bundled providers who continue to claim that they are simply unable to break those costs out of their integrated delivery models, by basically requiring that unbundled providers disclose those costs, while those who couldn’t (or said they couldn’t) needn’t.

I am encouraged that this new proposal does not make that differentiation. In response to my question on the issue last week, Assistant Secretary of Labor Phyllis Borzi noted that they had heard from a number of sources during the course of the process and comment periods that many plan sponsors still are under the impression that recordkeeping is “free,” and they felt it was necessary to help disavow them of that notion. Back in the day when recordkeeping was routinely priced as a discrete service, it generally was found to constitute about 20% of the total costs for a DC plan; so, IMHO, it’s certainly large enough to warrant a separate disclosure. Ms. Borzi noted that those who may (still) find it difficult to comply with the measure have a year to do so. Personally, I would argue that they should have seen it coming before now.

As for that revenue-sharing case, well, we’ll take a look at it next week—unless, of course, we have another not-so-quiet week.

While the spate of revenue-sharing suits has—for the moment, anyway—faded into the background, fees remain one of the most hotly debated topics in our industry.

If anything, the intensity has heightened in recent weeks, as we near the Form 5500 filing deadline for December plan-year ends, even as we anxiously await the new 408(b)(2) fee disclosure regulations from the Labor Department—regulations that might well have been at some odds with legislation proposed by Congressman George Miller (D-California) that rode through the House as part of that extenders bill before being dropped by the Senate.

The urgency behind these initiatives is two-fold: to force those who provide services to these plans to more fully and accurately disclose their fees to plan fiduciaries, and to provide participants with some idea of the monies that are being netted from their investment returns (and taken from their accounts). Ultimately, it is about helping people make better, or at least more informed, decisions about their retirement plan investments—and these initiatives are all predicated on the notion that these fees are not adequately disclosed, or sufficiently understood, at present.

That said, a report recently issued by the Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies (from its 11th Annual Retirement Survey) paints a somewhat different picture (see 401(k) Participants not as Knowledgeable as Employers Think).

Asked whether they would like to receive more information from their retirement plan provider about fees and expenses associated with their plan, two thirds of the roughly 600 employers surveyed (and these were not limited to clients of Transamerica) said no, and half of those strongly disagreed with that proposition (smaller firms were somewhat more likely to disagree strongly). Now, that’s a startling statement in view of the characterization of the current state of 401(k) fees by many in Congress and most in the media—not to mention a few in the industry itself.

Asked if those in their firm who were responsible for overseeing the retirement program had a “clear understanding of the fees and expenses associated with the retirement plan,” nearly all—94%—at least somewhat agreed with that proposition. Nearly three-quarters of those at (277) larger firms strongly agreed with that statement, as did nearly half of the smaller firms (271). Could it be that these employers weren’t interested in receiving additional disclosures because they felt they already understood?

Moreover, strong majorities of employers felt that their workers had a similarly clear understanding of the fees associated with their account; one in five strongly agreed with that statement, while roughly half were willing to say they “somewhat agreed” with the proposition. Those results, of course, stood in some contrast with workers, where only about a quarter were willing to say they were aware of fees that may be charged to their account (admittedly, nearly as many weren’t sure, while about half said they were not aware).

These are the kinds of results that tend to work legislators, consultants/advisers—and journalists—into a lather. The “common wisdom” is, of course, that retirement plans are being gouged; that retirement plan sponsors are complacent, if not complicit in the theft; and that plan participants are oblivious to it all.

We may draw some comfort from the reality that most retirement plan fees are drawn from the expense ratios applied to the various funds, ratios that are generally disclosed, if somewhat imperfectly, to plan fiduciaries and participants alike (we may not yet know the apportionment, but the gross amount is certainly ascertainable). And yet, most advisers would likely view the Transamerica Center results with scepticism, if not downright cynicism. I can hear many of you saying to yourself right now, “They may THINK they know what they’re paying, but they really don’t.”

That said, don’t YOUR clients know what they are paying?

It’s hard to know exactly what inferences to draw from the research. Perhaps the plan sponsors are being misled or maybe misinformed; perhaps they do have a workable, if imprecise, idea of the plan costs. Improbable as this might seem, they might even happen to be a uniquely well-informed segment of plan sponsors. We may know what they are thinking, but we do not know what they think they are paying, much less how realistic that assessment.

Regardless, more disclosure is surely coming and—whether they think they know and don’t, or think they do and are correct in that assumption—IMHO, it’s hard to imagine that those disclosures won’t be a positive contribution to the exercise of their fiduciary responsibilities.

Here’s hoping it keeps us all thinking, rather than leaving us all guessing.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

Anyone who has been paying attention to 401(k) plan litigation these past several years knows that a common trigger—perhaps the most common trigger—for litigation is the presence of company stock in the plan; more specifically, the presence of company stock that has sharply declined in value. Indeed, one has only to look at the two-month period following the struggle to contain the current oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the number of litigants and potential litigants circling the BP 401(k) plans to appreciate just how much more aggressive the plaintiffs’ bar has become in pursuing such actions.

That said, those who have been paying attention to how these cases have played out in court are doubtless aware that many, perhaps most, are not coming to trial at all. Rather, they have been dismissed with what, IMHO, is startling regularity, due to a “presumption of prudence.”

Now, one needn’t scour ERISA’s text to discern the boundaries of this legal construct; indeed, that would be a futile effort. Rather, it is a concept gleaned by the courts (and subsequently enshrined in legal precedent) from their understanding of the black letter of the law. It is a concept that found its footing in a 1995 case called Moench v. Robertson. Now, in that case, as in many of the new generation of “stock drop” cases (drawing their name from the fact that the action arises after the value of the stock drops), a plan participant sued a plan committee for breaching its fiduciary duty based on its continued investment in employer stock after the employer's financial condition “deteriorated.” The Moench court (the 3rd Circuit) affirmed the duty of prudence, but looked to ERISA’s diversification requirement and the allowances made for employer stock holdings in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), and saw there a rebuttable presumption that an ESOP fiduciary that invested plan assets in employer stock acted consistently with ERISA (bearing in mind that, since Moench dealt with an ESOP, the plan document itself called for investment primarily in employer securities).

Now, I will admit to being something of a strict constructionist in my interpretation of the law. I am suspicious of those who manage to, through some jurisprudential alchemy, wrest unexpected (and likely unintended) legal conclusions by reading between the lines of the letter of the law. Further, I am generally distrustful of a process that builds on those kinds of legal “extensions” to base future determinations that are, IMHO, often far afield from the intentions of the law itself. After all, once you have established that 2 + 2 = 5, how hard is it to argue that 2 + 5 = 10?

Ironically—certainly in view of how the resulting Moench presumption has proven to be a powerful force in dismissing many of the stock drop cases at the pleading level—though the 3rd Circuit found a presumption of prudence, it reversed summary judgment for the committee/defendants because the facts alleged (precipitous drop in stock prices, committee members' knowledge of the impending collapse, and their conflicted loyalties as corporate insiders and fiduciaries), if proven, could overcome the presumption. And that finding came in the context of an ESOP, a plan design that, if not exempt from ERISA’s fiduciary strictures, would certainly seem to warrant a certain reasonable amount of fiduciary deference in the decision to hold employer stock.

That said, today the law of the land would seem to lie squarely on the side of plan fiduciaries who continue to hold out employer stock as a plan investment, come hell or high water (literally, in some cases). In effect, this “presumption of prudence” seems to have become a magic talisman against which no claim of malfeasance can be successfully alleged, much less established, simply because the courts have discovered (a cynic might say created) a presumption that holding employer stock is appropriate.

Plan fiduciaries have long been tempted by the allure of placing employer stock in these programs, and plan participants have, in large part, responded favorably1. Frankly, I find the rapaciousness of the plaintiffs bar on such matters to be unseemly at best—some downright unscrupulous—and many of the so-called “investigations” are nothing more than a fig-leaf-cloaked excuse to troll for potential litigants. Disaster can befall the best of firms, and stock prices sometimes tumble for reasons that have nothing to do with the fiduciary management of these plans.

That doesn’t mean that plan fiduciaries can pretend that they do not know things they clearly know as corporate fiduciaries; nor, as a recent amicus brief filed by the Labor Department on the broadening application of the Moench decision states, should the securities laws “immunize fiduciaries who knowingly incorporate false SEC filings into participant communications from liability under ERISA” (see “Solis Argues for Stock Drop Case Law Change”).

In this day and age, a plan fiduciary unable to see the potential for employer-security-related litigation is perhaps unworthy of the role; and, IMHO, a dual-role plan/corporate fiduciary unable to appreciate the potential for a conflicted duty vis-à-vis his or her responsibility to the retirement plan is living in a state of active denial.

As for those not yet targeted by litigation, thus far the courts may have presumed that plan fiduciaries are entitled to a certain deference in such matters—but, IMHO, that’s stretching the letter of the law.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD



1 Nor, as some like to posture, are participants necessarily bludgeoned into investing disproportionately large sums of their retirement savings there. Sure, the match accounts for some, and perhaps displaced loyalty some more, but I have found that participants are simply more familiar—and comfortable—with that option.

Over the weekend, I reacquainted myself with that episode of the HBO miniseries “John Adams” titled “Independence.” As a writer and editor, I watched with a special appreciation the part where Benjamin Franklin and John Adams are “tweaking” Thomas Jefferson’s draft—and the pain in the latter’s face as his “precisely chosen” words were modified. All in all, a modest sacrifice, to be sure. But I, for one, could feel his pain.

That said, anyone who has ever found their grand idea shackled to the deliberations of a committee, who has had to kowtow to the sensibilities of a recalcitrant compliance department, or who has simply suffered through the inevitable setbacks all too frequently attendant with human existence must have at least a modest appreciation for the trials that confronted not only that document’s authors, but those then living in these not-yet-united states.

Without question, 1776 is one of those turning points in history, not just for this nation but, in the course of time, for the world as well. And yet, from the perspective of those who, in 1776, put not only their property, but their lives on the line to achieve what we will commemorate this weekend, the prospects of success must surely have seemed unlikely. Indeed, 1776 itself was full of disappointments for many supporting the cause of independence—and near disasters for George Washington’s Continental Army. One can garner a sense for the change in tide by noting that Thomas Paine in January of that year published “Common Sense,” but before the year was out had turned his pen to “The American Crisis,” fretting about “sunshine patriots” in “times that try men’s souls.”

However, before the year was out, Washington’s troops would cross the Delaware under unimaginable conditions and win a stirring victory at Trenton, on their way to a series of impressive but largely unappreciated victories against the British army in New Jersey. Not that the worst was behind them: Less than a year later, Washington’s troops would winter at Valley Forge. Independence may have been declared in 1776, but it was not won until 1781, and not official for two years more.

The point, of course, is that we have much to be thankful for this Independence Day: for those who had the courage to stand up for the principles and ideals on which this nation was founded, for those who were willing then to take up arms to defend those principles and ideals against overwhelming odds, and those who have done so to this day.

If we are to preserve those “unalienable rights,” if we are to continue to enjoy the freedoms of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” we must remember that the truths so eloquently espoused in 1776 may indeed be self-evident, but dictators and tyrants from time immemorial have sought to vanquish them. It is easy to forget amongst the grilling, fireworks displays, and summer temperatures just how precious those rights are, and how rare still in this world.

This Independence Day, we should remember that, “in the course of human events,” the battles that preserve those ideals for us and future generations are never really “won”; they must be fought for every day.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

For those interested in learning more about the events noted above, I heartily recommend:

“1776” by David G. McCullough
“Washington’s Crossing” by David Hackett Fischer
“Almost A Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence” by John Ferling
“His Excellency: George Washington” by Joseph J. Ellis

For those who prefer a “lighter” read (a la historical fiction), check out:
“To Try Men's Souls: A Novel of George Washington and the Fight for American Freedom” by Newt Gingrich, William R. Forstchen, and Albert S. Hanser

PLANSPONSOR’s National Conference last week featured a series of panels titled “Five Things You Need to Know About…” focused on a series of topics.

One of those was qualified default investment arrangements (1), or QDIAs—and while the “five things” that follow are somewhat different from the list presented by that panel, what follows was certainly inspired by the discussion.

Here’s my list:


(1) You don’t need to have a QDIA to get 404(c) protection.

IMHO, one of the most marvellous things about the Pension Protection Act’s defined contribution provisions was that they weren’t imposed on plan sponsors. They provided clarity, structure, guidance, and, yes, protection on things like automatic enrollment, contribution acceleration, and default fund choices—but didn’t require that you embrace these concepts, unless, of course, you hoped to benefit from the protections associated with adhering to those structures. Sure, IMHO, it’s a lot easier to obtain 404(c) protection under the umbrella of the PPA’s qualified default investment alternative (QDIA) provisions—but plan sponsors who had those protections in place before the PPA can still have them by still continuing to doing the things required to retain them today.

(2) You need to pay attention to participant notices.

Among all the fuss over what a QDIA is, and the applicable structures for automatically enrolling participants in those options, it has been easy to gloss over the requirement to notify those defaulting workers that they are being defaulted, and that they have a right to opt out—both upon enrollment and annually thereafter. Failure to provide the proper notices at the proper times has long been an impediment to fulfilling 404(c)’s conditions—and, if you’re not careful, perhaps enough to thwart QDIA’s shield as well.

(3) A QDIA doesn’t have to be a target-date fund.

Admittedly, target-date funds are the low-hanging fruit of QDIA options. While balanced funds, managed accounts, or even target-risk funds are explicitly acknowledged in the regulations, it is also clear that in order to be “qualified,” the QDIA must be structured in such a way as to take into account the age of the participant and/or the workforce (see “IMHO: It’s About Time” at http://www.plansponsor.com/IMHO___It’s_About_Time.aspx). New adoptions seem to be embracing the target-date approach, but, at least anecdotally, it seems that plan sponsors who previously had a balanced-fund default are finding ways to make it work.

(4) The fiduciary requirements to prudently monitor and select a QDIA are no less than for any other plan investment option—and they are fiduciary requirements.

Plan fiduciaries can reap significant benefits from the adoption of a QDIA, and participants even more so—if the option is prudently selected and monitored. Now, personally, I think you could make a case that the selection of an investment fund in lieu of any participant direction whatsoever (much less one that studies consistently indicate will likely never be reallocated) should, if anything, be held to a higher standard than that imposed on the “regular” investment options on the retirement plan menu.

But, at a minimum, in the QDIA regulations, the Labor Department made it abundantly clear that “selection of a particular qualified default investment alternative… is a fiduciary act and, therefore, ERISA obligates fiduciaries to act prudently and solely in the interest of the plan’s participants and beneficiaries.”

Moreover, that, “[a]s with other investment alternatives made available under the plan, fiduciaries must carefully consider investment fees and expenses when choosing a qualified default investment alternative.”

(5) Just because a default fund isn’t a QDIA doesn’t mean it isn’t a prudent default choice.

While target-date vehicles are certainly convenient for plan sponsors and well-received by participants—and explicitly acknowledged as QDIA-eligible—they aren’t the exclusive prudent choice for a default option. Of course, choosing something else—a target-risk fund with no age orientation, a balanced offering, or even a stable value fund—won’t afford you the same protections that a QDIA will. On the other hand, a well-chosen, thoughtfully monitored investment default might not require them.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

(1) Default investments are investment options chosen by plan fiduciaries in situations where participants fail to provide investment instructions, either through some kind of administrative oversight, or in cases such as automatic enrollment. The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) provided certain specific conditions under which plan fiduciaries would be afforded special protections when certain specific qualified default investment alternatives were provided for that purpose.

“When the going gets tough, the tough get going,” or so goes the old saying.

It’s a saying with the requisite amount of bravado to stiffen one’s upper lip and shore up one’s resolve as we plough through yet another tough market cycle; a period in which, by all traditional measures, “alternative” investments should be a good place to seek shelter from the storm.

This time may be different, of course. Real estate, one of the most popular (at least in terms of its presence in pension portfolios), served to set off most of the recent market tumult, and is still struggling to make its way back (though one should be careful about the level to which one expects it to return). Private equity, writ large, feels a more precarious move at present, and hedge funds—well, many no longer live up to the name, despite their fee structures.


There are, of course, a growing number of alternatives to stocks and bonds—the traditional standard against which an investment is deemed to be “alternative”—but to boldly go where no one else is going is generally anathema to pension plan fiduciaries.

Of course, there will be (and perhaps already are) institutional investors with a perspective and horizon long enough to wade into this storm surge, those whose skins are “tough” enough to make the kind of prudent investment in strategies and sectors that can (and often has) pay big dividends in the long run.

But caution seems to be the watchword of the day, and many—perhaps most—are not altogether certain that we have weathered the storm. The world’s pension obligations loom large, the returns needed to sustain them less certain, the pockets from which new investments arise already “picked.” In a growing number of places, those already dependent on such promises are rioting in the streets (some days it seems likely that those expected to fund those obligations may join them), but those protests will not fill those depleted coffers, nor will they likely have any good effect in ameliorating the current market unsteadiness.

The going’s still tough—but the tough will, as they are wont to do, keep going.
The question, as yet unanswered, is where—and what—they will be going to.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

I participate in a number of LinkedIn groups (and “sponsor” a couple). In one of those groups last week, a member said they were interviewing potential new 401(k) recordkeepers/advisers—and asked a provocative question: What is the one question that you will be sure to ask the next time that you interview potential 401(k) providers?

Of course, we all know that the search for a new provider entails a lot more than a single question. And, as I skimmed my way through the suggestions that had already been proffered, there were a number of important and familiar inquiries; things having to do with the fees charged, fee disclosure, the quality of support staff, willingness to stand in as a plan fiduciary…. These are all important—so important, in fact, it was hard to imagine that they wouldn’t be routinely included in even the most casually composed RFP.

Having read the question—and skimmed the answers—I was about ready to move on. Ironically, the way this question was phrased (or at least how I read how that question was phrased) intrigued me; what WAS that one question I would ask the next time?

Now, having spent a fair amount of my career on the other side of that question (including a period of time when the group that prepared RFPs for a large financial services organization reported to me), I can tell you there are a nearly infinite number of ways to respond “yes” (with a clear conscience) without really meaning "yes, all the time"; ways to gloss over things like high turnover, to offer broad organizational-level expositions designed to assuage nagging concerns about profitability or “commitment to the business”; even ways to assure, without committing, on the subject of whether the provider will "stand in" in the event of a lawsuit, audit, or investigation. None of which should discourage or dissuade one from asking those questions, of course.(1)

That said, when it comes down to that one question, I kept coming back to one that gets asked all the time. One that you probably asked on your last RFP. One to which you may have gotten a response, but, I suspect, not an answer.

The question I would ask is, Can I get the contact information for three clients that have left you in the last 18 months?

Not that you'll get it, though you might—or that the selections won't be "tailored"—but the response (or lack thereof) can, IMHO, be "enlightening."

—Nevin E. Adams, JD


(1) If you want to frustrate a potential provider, just make them respond to an RFP where the questions are worded such that the only acceptable answers are “yes” or “no” (or make them put their “explanations” in a separate document). What many (still) don’t seem to appreciate is that most advisers/consultants take all that fancy verbiage and filter it down to a checkbox on a spreadsheet anyway.

Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that it was sending a questionnaire out to about a thousand 401(k) plan sponsors. The IRS said it developed the questionnaire because of the “critical role 401(k) plans play in our private retirement system” (see “IRS Provides 401(k) Questionnaire Details”).

Make no mistake: It’s going to take some effort to respond to the questionnaire—and respond you must. Described as a “compliance check,” the IRS notes that “failure to complete the Questionnaire will result in further enforcement action.” So, what does the IRS want to know?

Well, there’s a lot of information to be gathered about the plan from plan years going back to 2006: the number of employees, participants, their deferral levels, eligibility standards, service and age requirements, the existence and administration of loans and hardship withdrawals, the results of nondiscrimination tests, the determination of top-heavy status, the level(s) of match, and any changes to those levels.

The more interesting part of the questionnaire, IMHO, is the other questions the IRS asks; things like, Have recent financial conditions led to an uptick in hardships and loans? Does the plan allow for Roth contributions (and how many participants have opted for that feature)? Can participants use a debit card to take a loan? And, for plans that embraced automatic enrollment, did they do so retroactively or prospectively? And I’m curious not only about what plan sponsors have to say about the impact of factors like age, compensation, matching levels, and plan communications on participation levels—but what the IRS might do with that information.

There are, however, some areas that seem a bit like a baited trap: questions about if notices are provided timely, if excess deferral contributions were returned within the legal timeframes, even if the respondent as a SIMPLE plan exceeded the contribution limits.

And, make no mistake, this is a prelude to something deeper. In unveiling the project, the IRS noted that its Employee Plans Examinations previously conducted a baseline study of 79 market segments, and “the findings indicated that 401(k) plans are by far the most non-compliant plan type in the retirement plan universe,” going on to note that “since these plans make up over 60% of the retirement plan universe, it is important to the future of the private retirement system that these plans maintain the highest level of compliance possible.”

What will the IRS do with the information? It says that it will “ultimately result in a report published by the IRS describing the responses and identifying those areas where additional education, guidance, and outreach is needed”—and, perhaps somewhat more ominously, help the IRS focus its enforcement efforts “to address and/or avoid non-compliance related to these plans.”

All in all, I wish the IRS questionnaire wasn’t quite so long, complicated, and—for lack of a better word—intimidating. For plan sponsors, I’m sure it’s going to wind up being one more thing that has to be done when they already don’t have enough hours in the day—and one that could serve to plant a big red flag on their plan, to boot.

Here’s hoping that some good comes out of it—that the IRS does indeed discover some areas in which they can help plan sponsors do a better job of keeping these important programs in compliance—and that, perhaps, it will find that the programs are in better shape than they seem to think they are.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

More information is at http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/0,,id=223440,00.html

A version of the online questionnaire is online HERE

As a parent, you spend a lot of time telling your kids what to do, and perhaps more time than you think you should convincing them that it was their idea. If you’re lucky, you get to watch them make the “right” choices on their own—and to see them turn out well in the end. What you really try to avoid doing, certainly as they enter adulthood, is to make those decisions for them.

With defined contribution plans, over the last three decades or so, mostly we told workers what to do (or at least what people very much like them should do). And, despite a lot of hand-wringing to the contrary, most did. There were, of course, “holdouts”—a stubborn and/or inattentive group that resisted those entreaties, at least up until the point at which we did the right thing “for” them by automatically enrolling them in these programs. One might have thought that their resistance was thoughtful, perhaps principled, and maybe economic—and yet, survey after survey shows that those who were defaulted in stayed there. Were they lazy, afraid to make the wrong decision, unable to make any decision, or merely inattentive? Perhaps all of the above. Regardless, the debate about whether we should “impose” on them our sense of the right thing to do—to make that decision for the “recalcitrant” minority—would seem to be over.

The New Frontier

The new frontier in participant decision-making appears to be retirement income or, more precisely, helping individuals make arrangements for a suitable stream of income post-retirement. There is a general—and perhaps increasingly pervasive—sense that the solution to this challenge is already at hand (or could be with a tweak here and there): the annuity.

That assumption was in evidence last week at a presentation by a panel of behavioral finance academics at an event sponsored by Allianz (1). As part of its response to the Labor Department’s RFI on retirement income, Allianz had worked with the inimitable Schlomo Benartzi to assimilate a wide range of behavioral finance techniques to better understand participants’ reluctance to embrace annuities (at least in large numbers), and to help remedy “the annuity puzzle” (yes, it even has a name, apparently). Certainly from an academic perspective, there is no valid reason why an individual seeking a dependable stream of income in retirement wouldn’t take advantage of a product that purports to do just that. And yet, in the “real” world, individuals continue to defy those expectations.

All of which, to my ears, began to beg the question, Should we be helping participants to do the “right” thing about retirement income, as we did about retirement plan enrollment? Should we be making that decision for them as well?

It is an idea that is already “out there,” and one that seems of interest to the Obama Administration. Certainly there is a concern that many take their multiple defined contribution distributions between “now” and whenever retirement finally occurs in cash and deploy them for purposes other than retirement. This “leakage” from the system almost certainly depletes the accumulative effect of retirement savings for many younger and lower-income workers, leaving them to literally start over at their next place of employment (there is some evidence that larger balances accumulated by older workers are more routinely rolled over into tax-advantaged vehicles such as an IRA).

Which again leads one to ask, what WOULD be the harm in letting a default mechanism make the “right” decision for them, certainly so long as they could opt out? Hasn’t our experience with automatic enrollment shown not only that people are willing to let good decisions be made for them, but that they appreciate it as well?

We once resisted automatic enrollment as a design choice for reasons that seemed just as daunting: We didn’t know the “right” deferral percentage, weren’t sure how it should be invested, worried that it would lose value between the time it was withheld and (potentially) returned, and were bothered by the potential conflicts between state wage law and federal directives. The Pension Protection Act effectively resolved those issues, provided a structure for a valuable safe harbor protection, and yet managed to avoid mandating its approach. As a result, it’s more likely than ever that more savers will have more savings to manage at retirement, perhaps for longer in retirement, than would otherwise be the case.

Now, for most situations at present, the retirement income amounts involved may well be too small, the products available too expensive and/or complicated, the protections for employers and participants alike too vague, the portability and/or access to the funds frustratingly problematic. And, let’s face it: Current annuity designs (2) don’t really come in a convenient “trial size.”

Still, IMHO, we need to focus on creating workable, sound default decisions—because the alternative for many until we do will be making decisions by default.


—Nevin E. Adams, JD

(1)All in all, it was a fascinating presentation, and the report summary that accompanied it is well worth a read (see “Annuities Get a Behavioral Finance Makeover” ). Those reports included notions that workers, and especially older workers, pay too much attention to recent stock market movements, suffer from a “hyper” aversion to risk, and, after their mid-50s supposedly have a particularly tough time making complex financial decisions. All of which purported to explain not only why workers don’t make good investing decisions at retirement, but perhaps even to suggest that they wouldn’t want to (ironically, one study indicated that, given the opportunity to make an active decision to purchase an annuity, a surprisingly robust 49% did).

(2)For the record, I’ve no particular affinity for the annuity concept per se vis-à-vis an alternative that provides the reliable stream of income at retirement for a reasonable price, and no reason to think that an adviser-led participant solution couldn’t compete very effectively with an annuity, much as an adviser-led investment program can do as well (and perhaps better) as a qualified default investment alternative. Of course, every participant doesn’t have access to an adviser, and many don’t have accounts large enough to warrant those attentions—and we need solutions for those participants as well.

I’ve been a huge “Star Trek” fan all the way back to when I had to watch the original episodes on a tiny black-and-white, 13-inch television set with rabbit ear antennas (and, yes, adorned with aluminium foil). Unlike most of my friends at the time, my favorite character was Mr. Spock, whose understated strength, brilliant mind, and quiet commitment to logic had an appeal to a young kid who fancied himself to have all those attributes (thankfully, my ears weren’t pointed).

Perhaps as a result, early on, I mastered the “infamous” Vulcan salute that many people struggle to perform unassisted (it consists of raising your hand and spreading your fingers apart between the middle and ring finger), and the Vulcan greeting/blessing that accompanied the gesture—“Live long and prosper”—always struck me as being as elegant as it was simple.

While we all hope to prosper and live long, a recent Issue Brief released by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College reminds us of the financial challenges that are often attendant with living long, but that tend to be glossed over in retirement planning. That particular study claimed that those who are in good health heading into retirement had better brace themselves for higher, not lower, health-care costs in retirement—since the researchers determined that the expected present value of lifetime health-care costs for a couple turning 65 in 2009 in which one or both spouses suffer from a chronic disease (defined in that research as diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, or stroke) is $220,000, while the comparable tally for a healthy couple was projected to be—$260,000 (see “Being Healthy Could Cost You More in Retirement”). Now, as usual in such matters, there is a certain amount of interpolation and extrapolation at work. Still, without wandering into the statistical “weeds,” a primary reason for that somewhat counterintuitive finding is that people in good health can expect to live significantly longer than their less-healthy counterparts—and thus, according to the report, are at risk of incurring health-care costs over more years(1).

Now, the point of the report wasn’t to encourage an unhealthy lifestyle; rather, it seemed designed simply to underscore the need to set aside money (2)—and a significant amount of money at that—for health-care expenses in retirement, regardless of how healthy you are (or expect to be).

Healthy or not, all other things being equal, the longer we live, the longer we must rely on our retirement savings. Not surprisingly, confronted with the potential of outliving one’s retirement savings, participants frequently fall back on an assumption that they will simply work longer. Now, that’s a good solution, at least in theory; saving, rather than spending, for additional years can do wonders to shore up one’s financial security—as long as you can count on being able to actually remain employed, that is. Unfortunately, even those physically able and willing to do so don’t always have that option.

That’s a reality that participants don’t always appreciate—and, IMHO, one that is all too often shrugged off in the retirement planning process.

The better option, if one hopes to both live long AND prosper, is to prepare as though you won’t have the time or the luxury to do so; to take action here and now, rather than banking on the opportunity to “make good” later on.

Anything else would be—illogical.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

1 The report also acknowledges that, over those longer lives, those relatively healthy individuals may, nonetheless, eventually contract one of those chronic diseases.
2 More precisely funding. The report notes that “Households that delay purchasing insurance until their health declines run the risk of facing higher premiums, or for long-term care insurance, being denied coverage altogether.”

While the markets were in an apparent freefall last week, I could hear former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulsen on the TV in the next room telling (lecturing?) the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that the problems that led to the 2008 meltdown could, and should, have been dealt with sooner, and that we could, and should, have moved faster—and with more to stave off the crisis. The criticism then—as it was last week in Europe—was that this was a time to act, not to think; that if we didn’t act—act now, act decisively, and without question—well, the results would be catastrophic.

It is a theme that runs through Paulsen’s recent book, “On the Brink,” as he drags the reader from one impending crisis to another during those fateful weeks of 2008. In Paulsen’s retelling, those who back his “need for speed” are thoughtful and prescient; those who don’t, well, their motivations are generally painted as either blinded to the seriousness of the situation or hopelessly ideological. From the former Goldman Sachs CEO’s perspective, we weren’t bailing out Wall Street, we were saving the very financial system itself (though he was willing to let the politicians claim that they were saving jobs). And perhaps we were, so we set aside our doubts and concerns, gave the experts what they said they needed—and plenty of it—and hoped they knew what they were doing.

Now, in fairness, the financial system did stabilize and the markets did—eventually—return to some semblance of normality. Until ….

Now I, perhaps like many of you, am not yet quite sure what to make of the crisis bubbling in Greece, much less the response of the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and what that might mean to us. But the chorus—we must act, act now, act decisively, and without question, or else—well, it’s a little too familiar to those of us who thought we had already been there, done that. But, once again, we’re told that if we don’t, things will get worse, much worse—and we’re (again) afraid that’s not an exaggeration.

Déjà View

But make no mistake: There are some clear and disturbing parallels between this “rescue” and the ones that have gone before. Once again you have a sudden infusion of apparent wealth on paper that fueled a borrowing binge that fueled a spending spree that fueled more borrowing, until things reached a point where the system was no longer willing to loan money (despite lucrative fees)—at which point, the whole thing should fall apart. But at that point the outstanding debt is so large that that same system that empowered that situation now claims that failure is not an option. It’s not just that bank, or that automobile company, or that country…it’s all the other things that depend on them….

We’ve seen this before—and more than once—from investment banking to the foreclosed house down the street.

Now, if this was your compulsive gambler of a brother-in-law on the wrong side of another “can’t miss” bet that put him (and perhaps your sister) in trouble with his bookie’s “collection agency,” you’d doubtless bail him out, and insist that he check into rehab (at least the first time). Indeed, that’s what the Greek “austerity plan” is all about: raising the retirement age to 63 (from 61), freezing pay and cancelling year-end bonuses for public-sector workers (no simple thing that, when something north of a third of the population works for the government), hiking the nation’s VAT to 23% from 21%, and cutting retirement pensions by 14% (by some accounts, those pensions currently provide an 80% replacement ratio, adjusted for wage inflation).

This, of course, is also what set off those riots in Greece last week—and the concerns about what that portends for the implementation of this new bailout, and its ability to stem the tide, took a bit of “austerity” out of all of our retirement security last week.

Once again politicians have been led (many willingly and happily) down the primrose path by so-called financial experts—told that there was, after all, a free lunch; lured into a sense of complacency and then, abruptly, told something else. It is a formula that has, again, taken us to what is being painted as a pivotal point, a crisis beyond which a chasm lies. We worry—that they are right, that it won’t be the last, that we’re not doing enough, or that we’re doing too much - again.

And then, somewhere in the dim reaches of consciousness perhaps, we realize that the folks telling us what we absolutely have to do now—without thinking, without questioning, without hesitation—look suspiciously like the folks who got us into this mess in the first place.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD